Finally, the die is cast. January 16, 2027, like the 2023 presidential run, promises another three-way electoral battle.
And, as the countdown gathers momentum, the major political parties are already assembling their campaign machinery, preparing for what could become one of the most consequential presidential contests in Nigeria’s recent history.
Last Wednesday, October 14, the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) inaugurated its Presidential Campaign Council, drawing membership not only from its ranks but also from prominent figures in opposition parties, who have thrown their weight behind President Bola Tinubu’s re-election bid.
Five days earlier, on Friday, October 9, the African Democratic Congress (ADC), had inaugurated its own campaign council for former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar.
The third major contender, the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), which is fielding the Peter Obi-Rabiu Kwankwaso ticket, has scheduled the inauguration of its campaign council for Tuesday, October 20, barring any last-minute changes.
But beyond the elaborate ceremonies, curious membership lists, political endorsements and familiar declarations of confidence lies a more fundamental question: where will the election be won or lost?
For all the political intrigues playing out across the country, the answer may lie substantially in the North, a region whose electoral strength was central to Tinubu’s 2023 victory but whose political disposition towards his re-election bid has become an increasingly important subject of debate.
Indeed, if the unfolding political developments are anything to go by, the contest for the North may well be the defining battle of 2027.
Thus, with more than 54 million registered voters across its 19 states, the North remains central to Nigeria’s presidential calculations. Next year’s presidential election is no different.
But can President Tinubu retain the region’s support amid Atiku’s challenge, the Obi- Kwankwaso alliance and the growing scrutiny of his administration’s record?
The region that supplied nearly two-thirds of President Tinubu’s votes in 2023 is confronting a different political reality ahead of the January 16, 2027 presidential poll.
Between Atiku’s northern credentials, Obi’s alliance with Kwankwaso, the politics of defections, economic hardship and the president’s formidable machinery, the contest for the North could determine whether Tinubu wins another four years or becomes a one-term president.
There is something instructive about the renewed political activity in northern Nigeria. From Kano to Katsina, Sokoto to Zamfara, Kaduna to Borno, and across the North-Central states, politicians who ordinarily would have waited until the closing stages of an election to show their hands are already making their positions known.
Some are openly mobilising for President Tinubu. Others are strengthening alliances with Atiku, a former vice-president, while a third force is emerging from the rather intriguing partnership between Obi, a former Anambra State governor and Kwankwaso, also a former governor of Kano State.
The activity is hardly accidental. Beneath the endorsements, defections, consultations and increasingly familiar assurances of electoral victory hides an uncomfortable truth: the battle for the presidency in 2027 may be decided substantially by what happens in the North.
For Tinubu, the significance is particularly compelling.
In 2023, his victory was built on a coalition that combined the electoral strengths of the South-West with the considerable political structure and goodwill associated with the late former president, Muhammadu Buhari, in the North.
It was an arrangement whose origins could be traced to the alliance-building that produced the All Progressives Congress (APC) and its historic victory in 2015. But four years in politics is already looking like eternity.
The political goodwill that helped Tinubu secure northern support in 2023 is not necessarily transferable to 2027.
This time, he must defend his own record, explain the consequences of his economic policies, answer questions about the distribution of political power and convince a region struggling with insecurity and economic pressures that another four years would serve its interests.
He must do so against a fellow northerner in Atiku and an Obi-Kwankwaso ticket that could introduce an entirely different dimension to northern voting behaviour.
The question, therefore, is no longer merely whether Tinubu can win the North. He did not win a majority of its states in 2023, yet secured the presidency.
The more far-reaching question is whether he can retain enough northern votes to prevent his national electoral coalition from unravelling. And the numbers explain why.
The Mathematics of Power:
2023 Versus 2027
According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria entered the 2023 presidential election with 93,469,008 registered voters. The latest reported register, released in October 2026 ahead of the January 16, 2027 presidential election, contains 103,428,715 registered voters.
That represents an increase of 9,959,707 voters, or approximately 10.66 per cent.
More strikingly, the North, comprising the North-West, North-East and North-Central geopolitical zones, including the Federal Capital Territory, accounts for 56,014,673 registered voters. That is approximately 54.16 per cent of the national register.
Excluding the FCT, the 19 northern states alone have 54,282,630 registered voters. In 2023, their combined register stood at approximately 48.59 million.
In other words, the northern states have added about 5.69 million registered voters since the last presidential election. The regional breakdown is revealing.
In North-West, the 2023 registered voters were 22,255,562 and they rose to 25,083,411 in 2026 while Tinubu garnered 2,652,235 votes in 2023.
North-East had 12,542,429 voters in 2023 and by 2026, they had risen to 13,965,475. Yet, Tinubu had 1,185,458 votes in 2023 from the zone.
The North-Central, however, excluding the FCT, boasted 13,793,424 in 2023 and as of last year, it has in its kitty, 15,233,744 registered voters. Tinubu had 1,670,091 votes from this number in 2023.
Over all, the 19 northern states had 48,591,415 in 2023 and by 2026, the number was 54,282,630. But across the states, Tinubu only polled 5,507,784 votes in 2023.
These numbers establish two important points. First, the North-West, with more than 25 million registered voters, is the country’s largest geopolitical electoral bloc. Its register alone exceeds those of the North-East and South-East combined.
Second, Tinubu’s dependence on northern votes in 2023 was enormous. Of the 8,794,726 votes that he received nationally, approximately 5,507,784 came from the 19 northern states. That translates to about 62.6 per cent of his total votes.
The figure is significant enough without exaggeration. It also reveals a political irony. Tinubu won only seven of the 19 northern states in 2023, while Atiku won nine, Obi won two and Kwankwaso won one – Kano.
Yet, Tinubu obtained more votes across those 19 states than Atiku, whose northern total was approximately 5.06 million. Thus, winning more states does not necessarily translate into winning more votes. Electoral margins matter, just as the distribution of votes does.
For context, Tinubu’s national margin over Atiku in 2023 was 1,810,206 votes. A hypothetical 20 per cent reduction in Tinubu’s 2023 northern tally, without compensating gains elsewhere, would represent the loss of roughly 1.10 million votes.
That would be equivalent to more than 60 per cent of his previous national victory margin. This is not a forecast. It is an illustration of how sensitive the president’s re-election arithmetic could become to even a moderate shift in northern voting preferences.
Of course, registration is not turnout. Ten million additional names on the register do not automatically translate into ten million additional votes. PVC collection, voter motivation, security, accessibility and the efficiency of election-day operations remain decisive.
But the numbers leave little doubt about where the largest reservoir of electoral opportunity, and potential danger, lies.
Northern Mobilisation: A Sign of Strength or Anxiety?
The emergence of some pro-Tinubu northern political groups deserves closer examination.
On October 12, prominent northern political figures operating under the banner of Arewa for Asiwaju declared their support for the president’s re-election after visiting Vice-President Kashim Shettima at the Presidential Villa.
Former Kano State Governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, spoke for the group, which is positioning itself to challenge perceptions that the North has been neglected under the Tinubu administration.
Shettima, has therefore urged northern leaders to unite behind the president, maintaining that the region stands to benefit from another term.
There is also the Tinubu Again Movement promoted by the Minister of State for Defence and former Zamfara State governor, Bello Matawalle.
In Zamfara, figures including former governors Mahmuda Aliyu Shinkafi, Abdulaziz Yari and Ahmed Sani Yerima have also participated in political efforts supportive of Tinubu. Senator Yari is the Director-General of the campaign council for Tinubu’s re-election.
These are not inconsequential names. They represent decades of political experience, organisational networks, traditional relationships and an understanding of northern electoral behaviour. But political endorsements are one thing. The ability to deliver the electorate is another.
Indeed, the proliferation of support groups raises a question that Tinubu’s strategists should not dismiss: if the president’s standing in the North were as secure as some of his supporters insist, why has convincing the region become such an urgent political undertaking?
There is a plausible answer from the president’s camp. Early mobilisation is evidence of preparation, not necessarily weakness. Having benefited from organisation and alliance-building in previous elections, Tinubu’s supporters could reasonably argue that they are merely refusing to leave anything to chance.
Still, the existence of electoral machinery does not extinguish popular resentment, where it exists.
For many northern voters, the election may become a referendum on the cost of living, the effectiveness of security operations, the availability of jobs, the condition of agriculture and the perceived fairness of federal appointments.
The allegation that the administration has disproportionately favoured the South-West has acquired political currency in sections of the region, although it must be distinguished from an established statistical conclusion.
For example, a 2025 Federal Character Commission assessment reported 401 northern appointments against 311 southern appointments within the positions it reviewed.
That finding challenges any blanket assertion that northerners hold fewer federal positions. But it does not settle arguments over the strategic importance of individual offices, nor does it cover every category of presidential appointment.
Electoral politics frequently operates in the uncomfortable space between perception and proof. Tinubu may insist that his administration has treated the North fairly. The question is whether enough northern voters agree.
North-West:
Where the Toughest Battle May Be Fought
The North-West is the centre of gravity of the northern contest. Its seven states of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Jigawa, Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi, have a combined 25,083,411 registered voters.
In 2023, Tinubu obtained 2.65 million votes from the zone, making it his largest northern source of support. Yet, he won only Jigawa and Zamfara.
Atiku won Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto and Kebbi, while Kwankwaso dominated Kano.
The region could consequently become a three-way contest in which Tinubu attempts to consolidate APC’s incumbency advantages, Atiku seeks to deepen his northern support, and the Obi-Kwankwaso ticket tries to turn Kwankwasiyya’s formidable organisation into a broader presidential movement.
Kano: The State That May Rewrite the Poll
With 6,570,276 registered voters, Kano is Nigeria’s second-largest electoral state after Lagos. Its register has increased by 648,906 since 2023 – the largest absolute gain recorded by any state.
In the last presidential election, Kwankwaso received 997,279 votes in Kano on the platform of the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP). Tinubu obtained 517,341, Atiku 131,716 and Obi a mere 28,513.
The political circumstances have since changed fundamentally. Now, Obi and Kwankwaso constitute the presidential ticket of the NDC, while Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, elected on the NNPP platform and previously identified with Kwankwasiyya, defected to the APC in January 2026.
Yusuf moved with a substantial number of state and federal lawmakers, bringing the APC an important institutional advantage. But he also left behind an unresolved political question: did the governor take the movement’s followers with him, or merely its elected officials?
That distinction could be the difference between victory and defeat in Kano.
The reconciliation of Yusuf with political interests historically opposed to Kwankwaso, including those associated with former governor Abdullahi Ganduje, has given the state’s politics the unmistakable character of a struggle over loyalty, patronage and political succession.
If Kwankwaso retains the grassroots loyalty that delivered almost one million presidential votes in 2023, his presence on Obi’s ticket could make Kano an unexpected battleground for the NDC.
But votes cannot simply be transferred from one candidate to another by political arithmetic. Some Kwankwasiyya supporters may resist Obi, while others may follow Yusuf into the APC. Atiku also has historical relationships in Kano that could become useful if the rivalry between its dominant camps deepens.
Whoever eventually wins Kano may not secure the presidency solely on that account. But losing it badly could seriously damage any candidate’s national prospects.
Kaduna: El-Rufai, Uba Sani and an Unsettled Electorate
Kaduna currently has 4,662,640 registered voters, compared with 4,335,208 in 2023. Atiku won the state in 2023 with 554,360 votes. Tinubu received 399,293, while Obi secured a substantial 294,494.
The state’s ethnic, religious and geographic divisions make it resistant to simplistic predictions.
Governor Uba Sani’s APC administration gives Tinubu an incumbent structure. But former governor Nasir El-Rufai’s political alignment with the Atiku camp introduces another powerful network.
There is also Southern Kaduna, where voting behaviour has historically reflected grievances over security, representation and communal relations.
The 2027 outcome may depend less on endorsements made in Kaduna city than on how competing parties navigate these interests across the state’s local governments.
Olawale Olaleye
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